

MIKOLA ABRAMČYK
President of the Rada of the Byelorussian Democratic Republic in exile

I ACCUSE THE KREMLIN
OF
GENOCIDE OF MY NATION

*Based
on the secret documents of the
Military Prosecutors and N.K.V.D.
of the U.S.S.R.*

September

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BYELORUSSIA

UNDER

RUSSIAN OCCUPATION

VICTIMS OF COMMUNIST TERRORISM

500 Scientists,
70 Poets and Writers,
600 Journalists and hundreds of Political and
Social Workers,
20.000 People of Intellectual Standing, Doctors,
Engineers, Teachers and Students,
3.000.000 Peasants and People of Working Classes



“When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

These fiery words of the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence, proclaimed by the American nation on July 4th, 1776, were followed by a catalogue of all the wrongs and abuses of law wrought then against the American people by the English kings—“despots” violating those of God’s natural laws by which the American people considered themselves to be as of right equal to all others in the world.

The then 3 million strong American nation, having appealed to the opinion of mankind, evoked the deep sympathy of the civilised world.

The Declaration shook the minds and hearts of all human mankind, of which the leading part hastened actively to participate in the liberation of the American people.

Byelorussian youth, and among them Thaddeus Kostushko—one of the most famous of Byelorussian ancestors—appeared in the ranks of fighters for freedom of the distant, and to them little known, American people.

This happened in the 18th century.

When the Byelorussian people, 18 million strong, declared the independence of Byelorussia in 1918, they, too, appealed to the opinion of mankind, enumerating all the abuses of the Russian tyrant rulers who had roused the Byelorussian nation to breaking of political ties with Russia.

But the enumerated wrongs wrought against the Byelorussian people by the Russian rulers over a period of 125 years, so surpassed in their horror the wrongs caused to the American nation by English rule that in the opinion of the civilised world they appeared improbable. The people of the 20th century, therefore, are inclined to be indifferent to the fight of the Byelorussian

people to secure for themselves their natural rights.

The Byelorussian people, having restored the freedom of their state on the ruins of the despotic tsarist empire, were forced to defend their young republic exclusively by their own forces, but their strength proved insufficient to counteract the new Russian imperialism of the bolsheviks.

The Council of the National Republic of Byelorussia, as the legislative organ elected at the National Byelorussian Congress in Minsk, 17-31 December, 1917, and their legal government, were driven from Byelorussia in 1920 by the Russian armies in obedience to the bolsheviks. Liquidating the local organs of the National Byelorussian Republic, the wily bolsheviks hypocritically declared Byelorussia also a republic; but the right to elect the legislative organs for this "Republic of Byelorussia" was reserved exclusively to the Kremlin.

Equally hypocritically they solemnly declared the restoration of full civic rights to the Byelorussian language, excluded by the Russian tsars from state and social institutions; but the bolsheviks ordered the Byelorussian people to speak this language as dictated by Moscow.

They called Byelorussian poets, writers, painters, artists to the work of reviving Byelorussian literature and art; but they confronted them with the impossible task of creating works "Byelorussian-national in form, antinational in content."

They opened Byelorussian higher educational establishments and scientific institutes, which had been closed by the Russian tsars; but those Byelorussian scientists who attended, believing the sincerity of the bolsheviks, were, without exception, arrested and later liquidated.

They gave to the Byelorussian peasants the estates of the landowners, but subsequently consigned them to a slavery unknown in the history of Byelorussian peasantry.

When, however, bolshevik rulers convinced themselves of the inacceptability to the Byelorussian people, of the alien philosophical ideas of the Kremlin and state system of living, then they began, on a mass scale, the physical destruction of the most cultured elements.

They destroyed, almost without exception, Byelorussian clergy. They shot or starved to death in concentrations camps about 20,000 Byelorussian intelligentsia. They killed 70 Byelorussian poets, writers and painters—for disobedience to bolsheviks. They remade and forged, in accordance with bolshevism, the works of Janka Kupala, the most gifted Byelorussian poet who languished in prison and whom they forced to suicide.

When the Kremlin tyrants realised that the spirit of resistance to communism in all the Byelorussian people was not to be broken, when they understood the solidarity of the Byelorussian masses with their leaders—the political and cultural elite in the country—and with the government in exile; when, finally, it became impossible for Moscow rulers to segregate those guilty of

disobedience to the Kremlin from all the unhumiliated Byelorussian nation the tyrants decided to begin the methodical elimination of Byelorussians without discrimination.

They sent into Byelorussia their "specialists"—soulless henchmen with the task of killing in series the citizens of untamed Byelorussia—and this without investigation, without any judicial formalities.

After one such assignment has been fulfilled by Moscow "prosecutors" in Byelorussia, in order not to provoke a desperate rising of the Byelorussian people, they sent down from the Kremlin an alleged investigating commission which purported to bring to trial such "prosecutors" and to punish them for "the execution of innocent people" as established by the investigators; but the "prosecutors" appointed subsequently continued to act as did their predecessors.

Such tactics of Moscow tyrants in the extirpation of the Byelorussian people show them up as hypocrits and deliberate genocides of the Byelorussian people.

A secret document of the Kremlin rulers which is at present in the possession of the government-in-exile of the National Byelorussian Republic, and of which a copy is enclosed, will convince the reader that the charges made by me against the Moscow tyrants are not fictitious.

Presenting here these documents, in which the Soviet tyrants themselves admit the shooting of 13,325 of my innocent fellow-citizens without any trial or judicial formalities, I address my ardent appeal to the governments of the civilised nations to defend my unhappy, innocent people destined for annihilation by the Kremlin tyrants.

I appeal to all the Christian world and, first of all, to the clergy of all Christian churches with a heartfelt plea that they do not remain indifferent to all the horrors suffered by my people.

I call upon writers, journalists of the world, champions and defenders of humanism, truth and justice to raise their voices in defence of my people from the bestial murders by the Kremlin tyrants.

In the name of God's laws and man's, I appeal to all the cultured world to come to the aid of the Byelorussian people.

Mikola Abramčyk

President of the Rada of the
Byelorussian Democratic Republic
in exile

A FEW WORDS FROM THE EDITOR

The secret Soviet documents published here characterize fully in themselves the Soviet government in Byelorussia as a government of legal bandits using their power to destroy heartlessly tens of thousands of innocent Byelorussian citizens. It would seem quite superfluous to add any comments to the accusations of the Kreml by President M. Abramtschik, still I consider it necessary to include a few remarks in order to help the foreign reader to grasp easily the sense of these Soviet documents.

To a foreign reader it would seem that a check on the activity of Kiselev by a Control Commission is based on a real sincere desire of Moscow to return order and justice in Byelorussia. Moscow seems to be absolutely separated from the sins of Kiselev, it appears that Kiselev has shot innocent Byelorussians during 2 years on his own initiative and on his own responsibility and that the Kremlin was totally unconscious of it.

But if the reader will ponder carefully over some statements of this document, he will find the tendencies of the Control Commission to justify Moscow absolutely unsuccessful.

1. The Control Commission complains about not being able to count all the victims of Kiselev because of disorder in his office and points out (even several times) that majority of the reports of Kiselev are not to be found in his office but in the central NKVD.

No doubt that Moscow had a possibility to control the activity of Kiselev even before the Control Commission left for Minsk, since the majority of the reports were continuously being sent to central NKVD. Thus it is difficult to believe that Moscow NKVD receiving thousands of reports of Kiselev (as it appears from the protocol about 15,000) just put them into files without being at all interested in their contents.

2. On page 15 line 37 of the protocol of the Control Commission it says: almost half of the accusations were relayed to comrades Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Vyshinski. This fact should have urged Kiselev to check especially carefully the facts, complaints, but they too were referred to the staff.

This means that about 7 thousand of relatives of the arrested appealed to Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Vyshinski, naturally with arguments about selfwill and injustice. These accusations sent from the offices of Stalin, Voro-

shilov, Molotov, Vyshinski to Kiselev for checking received no attention and the accused were shot.

How could one believe that Kiselev would not pay attention to the orders of Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Vyshinski, to check on the accusations, if he had not instructions that he should not pay any attention to them? Apparently the bloody deeds of Kiselev in Byelorussia were no secret for criminal Moscow Politbiuro with comrade Stalin inclusively.

3. Who can be persuaded by the Control Commission that Kiselev under the ideally developed system of Soviet espionage penetrating even into the family life, could "irresponsibly" go on with his hangmen in Byelorussia for 2 years without being noticed by Moscow.

4. The tendency of the Control Commission to release Moscow from responsibility is also visible in the desire to decrease the number of the victims. The protocol totals only 13,325 shot persons. The impossibility to sum up the rest of the victims is explained by the absence of reports. However, the Control Commission came from Moscow to Byelorussia. The majority of reports being in the Moscow NKVD were accessible to the Commission. Simple logic shows that in the first place just those reports had to be checked.

It is also strange that the Control Commission was not interested in obtaining the reports in the possession of the district prosecutors. The Commission was satisfied by the revision of "a few" reports in the office of Kiselev not even desiring to visit some of the near district prosecutors, as if it were a minor matter.

Moreover, it is well understood why the Control Commission evaded giving a full picture of the dead. If the Commission counted all the victims beginning with Moscow NKVD and ending with the reports found in the district prosecutors' offices, the "modest" number of 13,325 victims would greatly increase. It would be so horrible that the Commission would not even think of trying to justify the Kreml as merely neglecting Kiselev's activity.

5. The reader might find it difficult to understand why Kiselev in his reports changed the nationality from Byelorussian to Polish. In that case we find a satisfactory explanation in the telegram of the Moscow NKVD to Minsk asking to prepare a summary of prisoners and giving exact numbers regarding the nationality. Giving such orders Moscow needed to have Polish prisoners, because in Moscow there existed "Polish Military Organization," POW, which did not exist in Byelorussia. If such an organization was created, it naturally could not remain "passive." But in Soviet Byelorussia Polish national minority almost did not exist. To count Byelorussians in some Polish organization was absurd. That is how Kiselev found a way to discover the Poles. His fault consists only in the fact that he did it a little carelessly, roughly, but there is no doubt that had he not orders similar to the Minsk wire, he would not have bothered with extra work differentiating nationalities.

6. The hypocrisy and cynicism are also visible in the protocol of the Control Commission regarding the methods of physical treatment during investigation of Kiselev that were accompanied by several death cases. It is known to the whole world that physical torments with the aim to urge the prisoner to sign false accusations are the only rule of the Soviet government and such investigations are followed not by several but simply by thousands of deaths. The Control Commission accuses Kiselev of destroying better layers of society and better citizens of Soviet Byelorussia leaving free at the same time the worst enemies of the Soviet government.

The Jewish group, suspected of maintaining an underground synagogue and set free by Kiselev, disturbs the Control Commission. On the whole they have found that Kiselev, apparently saved from imprisonment the worst enemies of the people. This reveals there is still an unsatiated desire for blood on the part of the authors of the protocol and the Commission appears to be itself a part of the Kremlin bloody tyranny in Byelorussia. Accusing Kiselev that he did not destroy the worst enemies without any real facts that they existed, the Control Commission does preparatory work for subsequent Kremlin murderers in Byelorussia. For the successor of Kiselev nothing remains but to discover and destroy those worst enemies according to the indication of the Control Commission. If the successor of Kiselev does not achieve it, he will be threatened by the same fate as Kiselev.

The reader who knows very well the reality of the Soviet government acts, realizes that similar accusations charging "covering the worst enemies" were charges of predecessors of Kiselev. Kiselev executing his duties tried to find those enemies.

Control Commission has not brought anything new concerning Kiselev's activity. It is a common bolshevik tactics, its aim being to show to the Byelorussian nation that Moscow is trying to introduce justice, removing the unscrupulous murderer Kiselev, but at the same time showing new victims to his yet unknown successor.

Thus Moscow changed the murderers, there were piled documents in the archives of the "socialistic native country," justifying Moscow for taking no part in Kremlin's murder of Byelorussian nation. But nothing has been changed up-to-date.

Results of such Kremlin politics in Byelorussia were that in the period of 30 years, changing unscrupulous to conscientious murderers, there were physically destroyed or sent to a martyr death in concentration camps about 3 million from the total 18 million inhabitants of Byelorussia.

But whatever manoeuvres Moscow might use and the Soviet lawyers tried in their protocols or in their press to separate Kremlin from the offensive part, the Byelorussian nation always saw that the handle of the sword which hangs above the throat of the Byelorussian nation is in the hands of the Moscow murderers.

Therefore the Byelorussian nation has never believed in any change in their politics in relation to Byelorussia. Byelorussians do not appeal to their common sense neither to mercy, but defend themselves by all accessible means. The youth and in general all more active part of the nation fled into the forests and fought from there the Moscow invaders. But Byelorussian nation did not lose hope in the mercy of all the civilised world and its help in the battle with the cruel tyranny and murderer of all mankind.

Hoping in this help, the Byelorussian nation appealed therefore in the period of 30 years without interruption through the mouth of its legitimate representative to all the civilised world.

The Control Commission consisting of Soviet lawyers tried to involve Moscow as little as possible and to diminish the number of innocently killed people. The editor believes that the documents even as they are, will enable human mankind to understand all the horror and tragedy of Byelorussian nation and to react warmly to the appeal of President Abramtschik to help by all possible means to protect the Byelorussian nation.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. BOVO—Byelorussian Particular Military District
2. GVP—(Office of) Main Military Prosecutor
3. VP—(Office of) Military Prosecutor
5. VMN—Highest Measure of Punishment (Death sentence)
4. OO—Special Branch
6. POV—Polish Military Organization
7. KIJ—Communist Institute of Journalism
8. RO—Regional Branch
9. Group of Three—"Troyka"—The Board of NKVD giving judgment (sentence) on the basis of the investigatory materials always in absence of the accused person.
10. Special Conference—Same as Group of Three but only for higher matters.

SECRET

RECORD

July 29—August 2, 1939,
Minsk.

The Committee composed of: the Assistant Military Prosecutor of the Leningrad Military District, Military Jurist 1st Class Kolokolov, the Assistant Prosecutor of the Byelorussian S.S.R., Dmitrakov, and the Chief of Special Section 1 of the NKVD of the Byelorussian S.S.R., Senior Lieutenant of State Security Gorbachevsky, on the basis of the instruction by the Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. Comrade Pankratiev of July 23 of the current year, made an investigation of the actions of the former Deputy Military Prosecutor of the BOVO (Byelorussian Military District), Brigadier Military Jurist A. Kiselev.

In conformity with the decision of the Examining Magistrate in charge of the most important matters of the office of the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, Military Jurist 1st Class Comrade Rosenblit, the Committee was directed to study the actions of Kiselev relating to mass operations and to determine what harmful results stemmed from his criminal negligence. In particular, the following questions, to which, after a study of the material, exhaustive answers must be given, were submitted to the Committee:

- a) How many album reports were signed by Kiselev;
- b) How many and which album reports among those signed by Kiselev are tendentious and by whom were these reports signed in addition to Kiselev;
- c) Of what does the tendentiousness consist and who compiled, confirmed and vised the accusatory conclusions in matters on which reports are tendentious;
- d) Does the content of the tendentious reports correspond to the content of the accusatory conclusions and if not, wherein does the discrepancy lie;
- e) Who was sentenced to what on the basis of the album reports considered tendentious by the Reviewing Committee;
- f) What matters were the Group of Three or Special Conferences relieved of by Kiselev and what activities were suspended by him. (What was the basis for relieving and suspending the matters.

In as much as Special Division 1 of the NKVD Byelorussian S.S.R. does not have all the albums, since most of them are in the NKVD of the U.S.S.R., nor, likewise, a great number of the investigatory matters which were inquired

Минск, 1939 г. июля 20 - 2 августа дн.

... в составе пр. военного прокурора Ленинградского ВОСР...
... военного прокурора 1-го района КОЛОДЦОВА, пр. прокурора
ВОСР ИГНАТОВА и начальника 1-го отдела Мела ИКВД ВОСР - от него
та же просьба от ГИРБАЧЕВСКОГО, на основании предписания
Савва ГИРБАЧЕВСКОГО от 23 июля с.г., произвела проверку
ности бывш. воен. прокурора ВОСР - бригадиром ИКВД...

В соответствии с постановлением следователя по делу
ГИРБАЧЕВСКОГО - воен. прокурора 1-го района тов. РОЗЕНБЛЮМ, ко
мало изучить материалы дела ИКВД по массовым операциям
какие решения постановлены вступили от его преступной дея
В частности перед комиссией были поставлены следующие во
просы, на которые после изучения материалов в пять вечера

а) сколько альбомных справок было подано ИКВД...
б) сколько и какие альбомные справки из числа подан
ны не отсылались в ИКВД и кем эти справки поданы...
в) в чем заключается тенденциозность и кем составлены эти
и зафиксированы обвинительные заключения по делам, справки по которым
поставлены тенденциозными;

г) отвечает ли содержание тенденциозных справок содержанию
обвинительных заключений и если нет, то в чем расхождение;

д) кто и чему присвоен по альбомным справкам, признанным реза
ционной комиссией тенденциозными;

е) какие дела были ИКВД сняты с трюки или с расследования
ния и какие дела были им прекращены. Советательность снятия и прек
щения дел.

В связи с тем, что в 1-м Отделе ИКВД ВОСР всех альбомов нет,
так как большинство из них находится в ИКВД ВОСР, отсутствует также о
нее количество следственных дел, затребованная явкой прокуроров объез
стей, Прокуратурой ВОСР, ЗП ВОСР и ИКВД ВОСР для пересмотра, комиссия
не имеет возможности дать полностью подробные ответы на поставленные
перед ней вопросы следователем по различным делам.

В силу этого комиссия нашла необходимым изучить деятельность
ИКВД и изложить ее в другом виде, нежели это требуется указанным
выше постановлением.

Работа ИКВД по жалобам.

К поступающим в военную прокуратуру жалобам обвиняемых или член
их семей ИКВД относится исключительно безответственно. Вовремя не
принимается мер по своевременному расследованию и разрешению дел.
Судя по его резолюциям у ИКВД уже возрасталась одна из самых оче
идея такова: "в барак", "оставить без ответа", "суд. си.", "отказать",
"и оставить", "оставить что следовало из обвинений". ИКВД и члены
резолюции ИКВД: "оставить жалобнику", но никто из дел этого
делать. Мотив отъездов из резолюции та же самая. Брошенные постановления
жалоб без всяких пометок и резолюций также одно в архиве.

This is the cut of the first page of the original secret document which is in our possession.

after by a number of District Prosecutors, the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Byelorussian S.S.R., the Military Prosecutor of the BVC and the NKVD of the U.S.S.R., for review, the Committee cannot fully give detailed replies to the questions put to it by the Examining Magistrate on the most important matters.

In view of this, the Committee found it necessary to study the actions of Kiselev and set them forth in another way, in as much as it is required by the above-mentioned order.

KISELEV'S WORK ON COMPLAINTS

Kiselev's handling of the complaints sent to the Office of the Military Prosecutor by accused persons or members of their families was wholly irresponsible. A large number of complaints were not examined by him at all, but were referred to the staff. Judging by his decisions, Kiselev was working out a special system of: "for the staff", "leave unanswered", "convicted", "deny", "for information", "communicate that investigation continues". There are also such decisions by Kiselev as: "inform the complainant", but nobody ever thought of ever doing so. The reasons for refusals are not evident in the decisions. An enormous number of complaints without any notations and decisions are also filed away.

Evidently considering his superiors, Assistant Military Prosecutor, Military Jurist 2nd Class Triaskin, also did some writing off. In 1938 he answered many complaints, but most of his answers are not concrete; the complainants received no satisfaction, and some of these answers served only to discredit the Office of the Military Prosecutor and Triaskin himself. For instance, at the conclusion of his communications, Triaskin wrote these complainants: "Your husband (son or brother) has been convicted. The content of his sentence is unknown to me."

In 1937 Kiselev groundlessly referred 127 complaints to the staff, and in 1938, 244 complaints (a list of these complainants is attached to the record).

The absolute majority of these complaints represent indications of the utmost importance, to which Kiselev, as Prosecutor, of necessity had to react. For instance, complainants Franz Danilovich Zakrzhevsky, Dmitri Ustinovich Lazarev, A. N. Semenov, and others, wrote to him that they were subjected to illegal methods of investigation and that they were forced by physical methods to give testimony. Kiselev referred these complaints as well to the staff.

Almost half the complaints came from the audience chambers of Comrades Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov and Vyshinski. This obliged Kiselev to review the facts set forth in these complaints particularly carefully, but they too were referred to the staff.

A number of complaints are made by persons sentenced for varying terms. They set forth facts from which it can be seen that injustice was allowed with respect to these complainants and that it is imperative to verify the

justness of their sentences. The Committee has not determined any instances in which Kiselev demanded the review of a case as a result of such complaints.

SURVEILLANCE WORK OF THE NKVD

In the Office No. 452 of the Military Prosecutor there are several thousand reports and sanctions for the arrest of citizens throughout the Byelorussian S.S.R. These documents were sent by regional prosecutors to the Office of the Military Prosecutor when Kiselev was incumbent, in as much as these matters came under surveillance. These documents bear no notations by Kiselev. They are all put away in drawers and it is not certain whether he looked at them.

Kiselev himself issued a large number of sanctions, but in the Office of the Military Prosecutor itself there is but a small number of reports and copies of decisions. In most of these report folders the results of the cases are unknown. Nor does it seem that anyone showed interest in these questions.

No remarks whatever by Kiselev with regard to investigation have been found on any of these report folders for 1937-1938, without exception. A large number of reports have no notations as to the person issuing the sanction and the date.

A large number of sanctions were issued by Kiselev even for matters coming under the surveillance of the Office of the Prosecutor General.

The Committee has not determined, through documents, any refusal of sanctions by Kiselev. The documents examined in the Office of the Military Prosecutor of the NKVD of the Byelorussian S.S.R. show Kiselev to be a rubber-stamp man who through his criminal negligence assisted enemy activities in the NKVD of the Byelorussian S.S.R. in the counter-revolutionary work it carried on by exterminating the best Soviet people.

This is corroborated by the fact that Kiselev issued sanctions wholesale on the basis of flimsy, and sometimes tendentious reports, not even seeing the investigatory material.

On July 1, 1938, Kiselev issued a sanction for the arrest of 98 military persons and members of their families all at once. According to the reports of the Special Section of the NKVD of the Byelorussian S.S.R. all the above-mentioned individuals are supposedly agents of the Polish, Latvian and other foreign intelligence services. These reports are not concrete and it is not shown by whom and by what the individuals listed therein are incriminated. Among the arrested are: Germans, Latvians, Estonians, Byelorussians, Russians, Jews, Poles and Ukrainians. Their ranks: Majors, Captains, Battery Commissars, Senior Political Leaders, Senior Lieutenants, Lieutenants and Red Army Men. Twenty-three of these individuals, according to decree No. 00485 of the NKVD of the U.S.S.R. were sentenced to VMN. Defendants S. S. Kurzo and V. T. Martyniuk were released. The investigatory work on a number of cases has not yet been completed. Among the convicted are: Russians, Jews,

Poles, Estonians and Germans.

Between June 9 and June 15, Kiselev issued sanctions for the arrest of 116 military persons. The same picture is found here with respect to nationalities and occupations (there are two Colonels: G. A. Kurnosov and A. S. Slizhevich). Of this number, according to decree No. 00485 of the NKVD of the U.S.S.R., 32 persons were sentenced to VMN and 1 person, V. A. Karpets, was released.

On July 13, 1938, Assistant Military Prosecutor Triaskin issued a sanction for the arrest of 31 commanders. In this case the circumstances are the same as in the preceding ones. The following fact, characteristic of Kiselev and his work, attracts attention. On November 17, 1938, Military Prosecutor Lupachev of Office 52 of the Military Prosecutor informed Kiselev that, when he was in Special Section MB 10 he interrogated the accused Anatole Ignatievich Ushkevich (arrested under this sanction by Triaskin). Ushkevich informed him that he was beaten by Chief of Special Section Soloviev, and that in prison a number of former commanders told him, "It is better to confess anything rather than to submit to torture, for in court everything can be cleared up." Ushkevich retracted his confession. Comrade Lupachev demanded that the case of Ushkevich be transferred to him, but Chief of Special Section Soloviev refused, stating that the matter was in the hands of the Special Section of the BOVO. This statement by Soloviev is untrue, since Comrade Lupachev was invited by him to participate in the interrogation of Ushkevich and consequently he had been handling the case.

Communicating this to Kiselev, Military Prosecutor Comrade Lupachev quite justifiably requested that the matter be taken from Soloviev and referred to another official. Instead of taking the appropriate measure, Kiselev applied the following to Lupachev's communication: "The matter will be reviewed by the SO of the BOVO Staff."

The fact that Kiselev issued sanctions indiscriminately, steadfastly and without entering into the substance of reports is proved by his issuing sanctions for the arrest of a number of individuals who, even according to these tendentious reports could not be arrested (examples cited below). Especially shocking is his having issued a sanction for the arrest of Artillery Technician of Special Section 24, Alexander Wilhelmovich Roder. In this report Roder is described only from the positive side, while no facts at all about his counter-revolutionary work are given. Despite this, Kiselev nevertheless issued a sanction (report attached).

By reviewing a series of investigatory cases and report folders, the committee established that Kiselev issued such sanctions without justification.

1. On January 19, 1938, Kiselev issued a sanction for the arrest of Stanislaw Vladimirovich Rego, born in 1902, a laborer, of Polish nationality. The report was compiled by Chief of Section 6 of the NKVD of the Byelorussian S.S.R. Uryvaev, on the basis of some testimony by one Danilov, to the effect

that he claimed to have enlisted Rego in a counter-revolutionary officers' organization. (It should be pointed out at this time that Rego has never been an officer.)

On April 10, 1939, this matter was dropped by the NKVD of the Byelorussian S.S.R.

2. On September 11, 1938, Assistant Military Prosecutor Triaskin issued a sanction for the arrest of 13 Jewish residents of Minsk: Girshi Gabrielovich Grienstein, Berko (no patronymic) Dinerstein, Chaim Movshevich Kuznetzky, Shmerki Leibovich Kaplan, Chaim Abelevich Lieberman, Naftali Ionovich Radunskyj, Yankel Girshevich Ruderman, Sholom-Chaim Mendelevich Rakhmizh, Movshi Mordukhovich Sandomirsky, Zalman Shlemovich Shub, Mendel Berkovich Epstein, Mendel Zalmanovich Yarko, Ilya Samuilovich Eskin. The reports for the arrest of all 13 persons are almost all alike-standardized. It is evident from them that these persons are supposedly members of an espionage organization existing in Minsk among Jewish clerics. They are all opposed to the Soviet regime and carry on anti-Soviet agitation. Half of these individuals, judging by the reports, are Rabbis of an underground synagogue. Kiselev signed this matter over to the Group of Three, but it was not known for what reasons and by whom it was removed. On April 11, 1939, the following were released from arrest: Shub, Lieberman, Grienstein, Kuznetsky, Eskin and Sandomirsky, the remaining cases still being in the investigatory stage.

3. On November 4, 1938, Kiselev, on the basis of a flimsy report by Section 3 of the NKVD of the Byelorussian S.S.R., issued a sanction for the arrest of Lucian Frantsevich Terletsky, born in 1890, laborer, carpenter in a dairy. No data on espionage activities by Terletsky are given in the report. On February 15, 1939, this case was closed by Assistant Military Prosecutor Zabolotny under paragraph 5, article 4 of the Criminal Law Code.

4. According to the report of the Chief of Section 5 of the NKVD of Byelorussian S.S.R., Kiselev issued a sanction for the arrest of Genady Vasilievich Buday, born in 1918, a Pole, student of the Minsk KIJ. From the report it is evident that Buday was said to be enlisted in the "POV" by one Przhozovsky. On June 14, 1938, at the order of Section 5, Kiselev made a notation: "by order." The meaning of this is not known, but it may be supposed that the Buday case was settled properly by order of the NKVD of the U.S.S.R. But in the same report folder there is an order by Kiselev himself of December 27, 1938, from which it is evident that the report for arrest is fictitious, in as much as in the testimony of Przhozovsky it is stated that Buday will be enlisted, while in the report, he has been enlisted. Kiselev terminated Buday's case by that same order.

5. On February 13, 1938, Kiselev issued a sanction for the arrest of Dmitri Ananievich Weiner. Kiselev issued his sanction merely on the basis of a brief order which bears a resolution by the same Kiselev: "To Comrade Plotnikov:

See that by February 15, 1938, there is a report." This report for the arrest of Weiner has not been received by the Office of the Military Prosecutor to date.

6. On March 16, 1938, Kiselev issued a sanction for the arrest of Platoon Commander of the 21st Mechanized Brigade Ivan Matveevich Zakobluk, suspected of espionage. The investigation was improperly carried out. Guilt was not proved by anything, but despite this, the matter, on authorization by Kiselev, was referred to the Special Conference. On July 29, 1938, the Special Conference terminated the matter.

7. On March 15, 1938, Kiselev issued a sanction for the arrest of the Chief of the Veterinary Service of the 4th Don Cossack Division, Military Surgeon 2nd Class Mikhail Petrovich Popok. As is seen from the reports, there were two testimonies against Popok by Muzachenko and Nevedovsky. Both testimonies were inconcrete, sabotage is not documented in anything and guilt is not proved. But despite this, Popok was sentenced to 15 years.

8. On January 15, 1938, Kiselev issued a sanction for the arrest of Thaddeus Maximovich Kozlov. The report indicates that Kozlov was accused by the testimony of one Kudinovich. However, in the testimony of Kudinovich, it is not Thaddeus Kozlov but Fedor Kozlov who figures. The place of residence is likewise incorrectly given. On May 13, 1938, Kozlov was sentenced to be shot. On June 5, 1938, the case was closed by the Military Board.

In exactly the same way Kiselev, wholly unjustifiably, issued sanctions for the arrest of: Stanislav Eduardovich Gronsky, Iosif Ivanovich Zalesky and Nikolai Pavlovich Sadovsky, as well as a number of other individuals, whose cases have been closed. Likewise unlawfully arrested on Kiselev's sanctions and held under arrest for a long time, were: M. N. Mukhanina, S. P. Novikov, G. A. Kaplan, G. S. Vantsovsky, H. S. Vantsovsky, Y. S. Vantsovsky, B. I. Ezersky, E. F. Gering, A. I. Skorbach, D. P. Gordei-Kasach and a number of other individuals.

On the strength of obviously tendentious reports, Kiselev issued sanctions for the arrest of: H. V. Parnikel—Captain, Chief of the Regimental School 180th a.p. (Artillery Regiment); Usman Neyazovich Neyazov—Red Army Man of the 100th a.p.; Vitaly Pavlovich Russak, Captain, Chief of the Intelligence Battalion Staff; Leopold Iosifovich Maslovsky, Red Army Man of the Fire-Fighting Command of Army Unit 4106; Ian Alexandrovich Udri, Red Army Man, Musician of the 100th s.p. (Engineers' Regiment). It seems that the Special Section did not have enough data and these individuals were not even arrested.

In the review of the investigatory matters settled properly by decree No. 00485 of the NKVD of the U.S.S.R. and the Groups of Three, it has been established that in a great number of these cases the album reports were incorrectly and tendentiously drawn up, which indubitably was of great significance in the final settlement of any given case.

A number of individuals were arrested without sanctions by the Prosecutor. In a number of cases relating to accused persons held under arrest, there is no visa by Kiselev, who skipped such matters. In signing album reports, Kiselev did not read the cases, and if he did read them, he did so very negligently, as otherwise he would have noticed crying falsifications intentionally admitted into investigatory actions and in the compilation of reports (this was done by the former Chief of Section 3 Genstein, now under arrest).

A review of the presence of albums in Special Section 1 established that Kiselev during his entire term signed 11,564 album reports (under decree No. 00485).


According to it: (under decree No. 00485)

Sentenced to VMN (to death)	11,009 persons
For varying terms	379 persons
Removed	176 persons

Kiselev, in the Group of Three, also signed reports on 3,045 persons, of whom:

Sentenced to VMN (to death)	2,316 persons
For varying terms	576 persons
Removed	154 persons

The figures given do not correspond to the actual facts, in as much as a number of album reports are to be found in Special Section 1 of the NKVD of the U.S.S.R.



The Committee did not have the opportunity of verifying the presence of album reports with investigatory cases, in as much as a large number of investigatory data are missing. In view of this, the Committee has extracted 500 investigatory cases that had been settled, which have been reviewed.

It has been established through this verification that a great number of

the album reports (signed by Kiselev) differ both from the factual material and the other data of the case. In a number of cases there have been established facts of falsification of nationality, social position, education, adherence to hostile parties. Participation in provocateur activities, crossing the border and other crimes, which were not brought out by the investigation, have been added.

Actually, these differences consist of the following:

1. Case No. 31551 of the defendant Ilya Zakharovich Kostyuk.

In the report it is stated: "From 1932 to 1936 he transmitted to Lisovski information concerning kolkhoz building in the B.S.S.R." In his testimony, however, it is stated that he only transmitted information concerning the moods of the kolkhoz members of his kolkhoz. In the report it is stated: "He transmitted material and decisions of closed party meetings of the Mogilev party organization and the party organization of the RO of the NKVD." In the case are discussed: the number of the arrested by the RO NKVD and the process of the sowing campaign.

2. Case No. 24882 of the defendant Vasili Romanovich Markovich.

It appears from the report that Markovich had been an agent of the Polish secret police since 1929, was recruited by Pivovarenok and for a number of years had transmitted espionage information to him. It is also stated that Markovich confessed his guilt.

It appears from the case, however, that Markovich did not confess to doing espionage work. Pivovarenok in his testimony says that he recruited Markovich either in 1929 or in 1931. He did not give him any assignment, but only proposed to him that he join the counter-revolutionary organization, to which Markovich consented.

3. Case No. 31447 of the defendant Iosif Adamovich Zakrevski.

It appears from the album report that: "Zakrevski transmitted to the Polish secret police through Valeria Zakrevskaya espionage information concerning the numerical composition and armament of the sections of the border troops of the Zaslavl border detachment and the location of the blindages and the firing points of the Zaslavl fortified region."

There is nothing of this kind in the case. All the accusations are built only on Zakrevski's confession, from which it appears that in 1929 he was recruited by his mother and through her he transmitted newspapers and magazines collected by him to the Polish secret police and he also communicated the location of the border detachment and its approximate numerical strength. Zakrevski's testimony is very suspicious.

4. Case No. 10771 of the defendant Leskadiya Melkhiorovna Kudrevich.

It is stated in the report that Kudrevich knew about the espionage activities of her husband and gave him assistance in collecting secret information. That has not been established by the investigation.

It is further stated in the report that Kudrevich partly confessed her guilt.

It appears from the case that she fully denied her guilt. It is stated in the report that she has been unmasked by the testimony of her husband, whereas he said nothing about her counter-revolutionary activity.

5. Case No. 12441 of the defendant Andrei Gavrilovich Ryabchuk. It appears from the album report that in 1936 Ryabchuk transmitted to the Polish secret police information concerning defence construction in the Logoyok and Pleshchenich border regions, and a list of persons who are hostile to the Soviet power and who could be recruited.

Ryabchuk confessed that he had led propaganda against collectivization and that in 1921 a certain landowner recruited him for espionage work. He was supposed to transmit the information through a person who would call on him, but during the whole time no one has called on him. The counter-revolutionary propaganda has not been confirmed by any one and by anything.

6. Case No. 22242 of the accused Ivan Ivanovich Pavlovich.

It is stated in the album report: "Have transmitted to the Polish secret police espionage information concerning organizational and economic construction in the kolkhoz of the Gressk region, the political sentiment of the population and persons who are hostile to the Soviet power. A former S.R. (Social Revolutionary)."

It appears from Pavlovich's testimony that he did transmit some information, but he does not remember what; he has never been an S.R.

7. Case No. 13440 of the accused A. Z. Dubkov (engineer of the Bobruisk Timber Trust).

It is stated in the album report: "By breaking parts, caused accidents in the plants which were accompanied by injuries to the workers who worked in the plants." It does not appear from the testimony of the accused Dubkov and from other facts of the case that any accidents occurred in the plants or, moreover, that there were human casualties. Dubkov's higher education has not been indicated in the report.

8. Case No. 20970 of the accused Adam Leontievich Voytus.

It is stated in the album report: "A kulak, collected and transmitted to the Polish secret police espionage information concerning the sentiments of the population, the defence measures of the streetcar park, the distribution of the units of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the city of Minsk and their armament."

It appears from the case that Voytus is a middle-class peasant and that he transmitted information only concerning the sentiments of the population and the park of streetcars.

The primary minutes of the examination of the accused, as well as the prosecuting attorney's sanction of the arrest, are missing from the (records of the) case.

9. Case No. 13385 of the accused Georgi Iosifovich Lyashkevich.

In the album report and in the questionnaire of the arrested person Lyashkevich is given as a Pole. According to his passport and other documents he

is a Byelorussian. In the primary minutes of the investigation, in the column of nationality, "Byelorussian" has been corrected to "Pole". The correction has not been annotated.

It is stated in the album report that Lyashkevich transmitted information concerning military groups located in the city of Bobruisk. In Lyashkevich's testimony it was said that he transmitted information to the effect that in wartime Railroad Detachment No. 22 would be formed in Polotsk.

In the (records of the) case the order for his arrest and the sanction of the prosecuting attorney are missing.

10. Case No. 31412 of the accused Alexandr Stefanovich Filist.

According to his passport and other materials of the case he is considered a Byelorussian, but according to the album reports he is a Pole.

In his testimony Filist says that in 1932 he attempted to set fire to the flax drier in the "Chyrvony Shtandar" kolkhoz, but changed his mind. However, in the album report it is stated: "In 1932 he set fire to the flax drier with a great quantity of flax." In the case there are no facts from which it would appear that there actually was such fire.

11. Case No. 20375 of the accused Vikenti Andreevich Erman. It appears from the case that Erman was allegedly recruited in 1925 by a certain Polish officer, went twice to Poland, and transmitted information concerning the political and economic state of the Logoyok region (Erman's testimony). In the album report, however, it is stated that he transmitted information concerning the military forces of the border and the defence works in the Pleshchenich and Logoyok regions.

12. Case No. 33737 of the accused Boris Ekhelevich Pogoda.

It appears from Pogoda's testimony that he transmitted information to the Polish secret police concerning the feeling of the workers of some enterprises of the city of Minsk, the carrying out of industrial plans, the number of workers and the possibility of the transition of some enterprises to defence production.

In the album report however, it is stated: "Transmitted to the Polish secret police information concerning the military units of the Minsk Garrison." The order for his arrest and the sanction of the prosecuting attorney are missing from the [records of the] case.

13. Case No. 21294 of the accused Grin-Movshovski.

In the album report it is stated: "While in Poland he occupied himself with provocateur activities in the Communist Party (b) of Western Byelorussia, and while residing in the territory of the B.S.S.R. he engaged in gathering espionage information which he transmitted to Polish secret police; had an assignment to commit diversionist acts in wartime."

In Grin's testimony there is not a word concerning the espionage and diversionist activities. As far as the provocateur activity is concerned, attempts were made to put the question to him; actually he did not do anything.

14. Case No. 30463 of the accused Adam Vasilievich Dvorak.

It appears from the album report that Dvorak received an assignment to collect espionage information concerning the military units of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and in time of war between Poland and U.S.S.R. to participate in an armed revolt, committing diversionist acts in the rear of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

In Dvorak's testimony and in the material of the case in general there is not a word concerning all this.

15. Case No. 21297 of the accused Zigmund Benediktovich Leshchevich.

In the album report it is stated that: "While living in Minsk, Leshchevich until 1926 collected and transmitted to the Polish secret police espionage information concerning military units and large enterprises."

There are facts in the case which indicate that Leshchevich did not live in Minsk before 1926 and, consequently, could not have collected the information.

16. Case No. 24746 of the accused Stanislav Aleksandrovich Dreysman.

In the album report it is stated that: "He collected espionage information concerning military units of the Gomel garrison and transmitted it to the Polish secret police; in 1930-1937 he transmitted information concerning a certain aviation brigade for which he received a reward."

In Dreysman's testimony it is stated that he has never engaged in espionage and has not received any reward.

17. Case No. 29704 of the accused Viktor Silvestrovich Tarletski.

In the album report it is stated that: "Tarletski conducted counter-revolutionary and Fascist propaganda among the population and he had an assignment to commit diversionist acts against enterprises of importance for defence during the period of military activities."

In the minutes of Tarletski's examination these facts have not only not been touched upon, but they have not even been hinted at.

18. Case No. 28187 of the accused Zhan Fritsevich Mostyn.

In the album report it is stated: "He called [people] to an armed revolt against Soviet power." This is altogether missing in the [records of the] case. The sanction of the arrest by the prosecuting attorney is also missing.

19. Case No. 31439 of the accused Iosif Aleksandrovich Verigo.

In the album report it is stated that Verigo transmitted to the Polish secret police espionage information concerning the distribution and armament of the Dzerzhinski border detachment as well as the guarding of defence objects. In the [records of the] case, however, there is not a word about it. The sanction of the arrest by the prosecuting attorney is also missing.

20. Case No. 31536 of the accused Sigizmund Sigizmundovich Gendevitski.

According to his passport and questionnaire he is a Byelorussian, but according to the album report he is a Pole.

21. Case No. 13390 of the accused Mikhail Mikhailovich Malevich.

According to all documents he is considered a Byelorussian, but according to the album report he is a Pole. There is no order and no sanction of the prosecuting attorney for his arrest.

22. Case No. 29581 of the accused Iosif Stepanovich Nesterovich.

In the album report it is stated that the defendant participated in illegal meetings of the leaders of the counter-revolutionary organization "POV", where problems of diversionist and terrorist work had been discussed.

In the [records of the] case, however, there is absolutely nothing about it.

23. Case No. 29777 of the accused Konstantin Semenovich Lisovski.

In the album report it is stated that the accused is a Pole and by his social status a kulak. In fact, however, Lisovski is a Byelorussian, a poor peasant and, in addition, completely illiterate.

24. Case No. 25824 of the accused Kazimir Antonovich Lutsevich.

In the album report it is stated that Lutsevich collected and himself carried to Poland information concerning the 18th Border Unit.

Lutsevich says that he was recruited by someone in Poland and when he came to his village he asked a certain Sosnovski to obtain information for him. Sosnovski carried this information to Poland and brought back a reward for him.

The case does not contain the sanction of the arrest by the prosecuting attorney.

25. Case No. 31411 of the accused Ivan Prokofievich Skuratov.

Throughout the whole case and in personal documents he is considered a Byelorussian. In the album report he is a Pole.

26. Case No. 33516 of the accused Stefan Iosifovich Pavlyuk.

In the album report it is stated: "By assignment of Narkevich he collected and transmitted to the Polish agent Yanovich information concerning units of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army." In Pavlyuk's testimony, however, this is altogether missing. There is only testimony to the effect that he transmitted information concerning his kolkhoz and that information was not of a secret nature.

27. Case No. 31781 of the accused Maryan Karlowich Vochinski.

In the album report it is stated that Vochinski had an assignment in case of war to carry out diversionist acts by destroying defence objects in the rear of the Red Army.

In the inquiry material nothing was said about it. In the [records of the] case the sanction of the arrest of Vochinski by the prosecuting attorney is missing.

28. Case No. 33448 of the accused A. V. Sharydo.

In the report it is stated that Sharydo transmitted to the Polish agent Lishinski information concerning persons who are counter-revolutionary minded

and who could easily be recruited. Sharido, however, in her testimony states that she informed Lishinski as to who was at the head of the kolkhoz.

29. Case No. 13384 of the accused Andrei Grigorievich Isaev.

In the album report it is stated that he transmitted espionage information concerning the units of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the Bobruisk garrison. However, in Isaev's testimony it is said that when he was recruited it was proposed to him to collect these data. It is not known whether he collected and transmitted them, because Isaev was not investigated on this question.

In the [records of the] case there is no sanction of the arrest by the prosecuting attorney.

30. Case No. 21513 of the accused Feliks Mikhailovich Veykshnya.

In the album report it is stated that Veykshnya is a member of the "POV", of which not a thing is mentioned in the material of the case. Furthermore, in the report it is stated that Veykshnya fled from the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the Poles. In the case, however, there is his testimony to the effect that he was taken prisoner by them. The [records of the] case do not contain the sanction of the arrest by the prosecuting attorney.

31. Case No. 13390 of the accused Aleksander Semanovich Rutkovski.

In the album report it is stated that Rutkovski is a Pole, whereas, according to all the facts of the case, he is a Byelorussian. The sanction for his arrest by the prosecuting attorney is not included.

32. Case No. 18509 of the accused Victor Ivanovich Zhetaytis.

In the album report it is stated that in 1927 Zhetaytis made contact with Polish agent Trofimov, who arrived from Poland, and that he put out of action the locomobile and injector of the factory pump.

In Zhetaytis's testimony (there are no other data in the case) it is said that he made contact with Trofimov, who lived in Poland, by correspondence and by his instructions he made contact with Rik and Stashchuk. As far as the other point of the accusation is concerned, it is said in Zhetaytis's testimony that he did not put out of action the locomobile and the injector, because he was afraid that he would be unmasked. It is not known whether the said apparatus were actually put out of action.

33. Case No. 32750 of the accused Ivan Ivanovich Zavileyski.

Confessed to doing espionage work, but the testimony is not concrete. In the album report he is considered a Pole and a kulak, but actually he is a Byelorussian and a worker—a carpenter. There is no sanction of the arrest in the case. The indictment was approved by Kiselev.

34. Case No. 40547 of the accused Yan Appolinariievich Plavinski, former First Lieutenant and commander of a section in military unit 5889.

Arrested by Kiselev's sanction on 6/25/38. As is stated in the report, he was an agent of the Polish intelligence organs. At that time, the investigator had no data. Not until 7/14 did Plavinski give confused information during the examination, to the effect that he was positively recruited on the

day of his arrival in the unit by Captain G. I. Mayor, who was unknown to him until then. Mayor's testimony is not contained in the [records of the] case. There is no report about him. It is clear that the case is doubtful. The indictment was approved by Kiselev.

35. Case No. 39865 of the accused Pavel Nikolaevich Leplinski.

The arrest and the indictment were sanctioned by Kiselev. This case is similar to the case of Plavinski.

He was sentenced to five years by a special conference on 6/19/36. Plavinski, the recruiter, did not give any evidence concerning Leplinski.

36. Case No. 39317 of the accused Mikhail Stepanovich Kozlovski.

The decision and the order for the arrest were made out for Mikhail Stanislavovich Kozlovski; they were later corrected in ink to read Stepanovich.

Kozlovski testified that he was recruited for espionage activity by a certain Dubrovski. His testimony is confused. Dubrovski's testimony is not contained in the case and it is unknown whether he has been arrested.

37. Case No. 20905 of the accused Ivan Andreevich Rykovski.

Kiselev sanctioned the arrest of I. A. Rykovski on 8/31/37. In the report concerning the arrest only autobiographic data in regard to Rykovski and his work from 1919 on were stated. At the end of the report it was stated that his wife was born in Poland and is acquainted with the writer Krainski, who is suspected of espionage activity. There was no material which compromised Rykovski. On 2/19/38, i.e. 6 months after his arrest, Rykovski testified that he was a Polish spy and that he was recruited in 1926 by a certain Gogmaer, to whom he transmitted information concerning the sentiments of the population and, in particular, of the employees of the People's Commissariat of Finances of the B.S.S.R. Gogmaer's testimony is not contained in the case. In the indictment it is stated that Gogmaer was sentenced to VMN. In the indictment, which was approved by Kiselev, it is stated that in accordance with Gogmaer's assignment Rykovski worked on a number of persons, preferably Poles, with the purpose of recruiting them for espionage activity in favor of Poland. He prepared a staff of spies for the Poles in case of intervention. There are no data concerning this in the material of the case.

38. Case No. 41534 of the accused Zakhar Abramovich Halperin.

6/15/38 Halperin's arrest was sanctioned by Kiselev. In the order for the arrest it is stated that Halperin "is a Polish spy and, as a result of that, he was connected with Byalik, the unmasked agent of the Polish secret police" (there is no report of his arrest). Outside of the confession of Halperin himself, there are no other data. Halperin confessed that he was recruited by Byalik, to whom he transmitted information concerning military units situated in the city of Minsk. Halperin and Byalik worked together in the city of Minsk in the Green Trust as gardeners, and it is completely incomprehensible why Byalik should have recruited Halperin.

The indictment was approved by Kiselev.

39. Case No. 32112 of the accused Avgust Ivanovich Ozérin, Zhan Dmitrievich Gebeyko, Albin Andreevich Zeydak, Albert Grigorievich Sheynin, Karl Ivanovich Krastyn, Yan Ernestovich Darkevich, Martyn Ivanovich Schmidt, Yan Frantsevich Mezhen, Ivan Ivanovich Medum, Frits Petrovich Zvigul, and Fridrikhovich Prayneno (the arrest was sanctioned by the prosecuting attorney of the Bykhov region).

All the arrested were of Lettish nationality. In the information in which the arrests of the accused were based, it has been indicated that they, being disgruntled with the Soviet government, conducted agitation among the peasant population and expressed a desire to go to Latvia. There was a single witness interrogated in connection with this affair. All the accused confessed that they were spies and were working for the benefit of Latvia. All were enrolled by Ivan Medum.

The indictment was approved by Kiselev.

The confessions were obtained from the accused by physical influence. The guilty were criminally prosecuted.

40. Case No. 33493. The accused: Ivan Feliksovich Zhevnerovsky, Stanislav Vikentievich Martyshevsky and Fedeor Nikiforovich Lopunov.

For what reasons Lopunov (a Byelorussian) was arrested is not known, but he testified that he was an organizer of the "POV" (Polish Military Organization) and he implicated two other accused. In the record it was stated Lopunov was enrolled by Zhevnerovsky. Yet Zhevnerovsky and Martyshevsky testified that Lopunov drew them into some Polish organization. By whom Lopunov was enlisted is not known. Their case under art. 58-10, part 1 was referred to a "group of three."*

41. Case No. 36610. The accused: Boris Vasilievich Bykov.

From the album report it is seen that Bykov in 1927 was enrolled by a Polish agent, Azevich, to whom he gave information about military construction in the city of Polotsk and about the new Orsha-Lepel railroad line. (Bykov resided and was engaged in agriculture in the village of Cherepovschina, Uman district). There is no testimony of Azevich in the records of the case.

42. Case No. 39788. The accused: Anton Antonovich Grabovsky, laborer, glass blower, almost illiterate.

It is seen from the album report that he was enrolled in the "POV" by a certain I. K. Mikhaleiko and that Grabovsky himself enrolled Mikhail Rutkovsky and Stanislav Dylevich (all three have been convicted). There is no testimony of these persons in the records.

Case No. 37469. The accused: Iuda Shepselevich Shukhman.

The order for the arrest (it is unknown who has approved it) indicates that Shukhman, a member of the counter-revolutionary organization "Bund" in 1918, was active against the Soviet government and served in the foreign * "Troyka"—a group of three—in the structure of the Communist Party is the smallest cell and sometimes the highest tribunal in a particular field.

intelligence. During the interrogation Shukhman confessed to spy activities. However, in the album report it is additionally stated that Shukhman's task was to expose former members of the "Bund" and to enroll them for espionage. This information is not in the record of the case.

The indictment was approved by Asst. Military Prosecutor Triaskin.

44. Case No. 43470. The accused: Arsenty Iosifovich Butko.

Member of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik); the sanction for the arrest was given by Kiselev on July 13, 1938. In the order for arrest it is stated: "A. I. Butko is an agent of the Polish intelligence organizations." There is nothing in the records of the case except the personal confession of Butko. What the reasons were for the arrest of Butko is not known.

45. Case No. 44185. The accused: Pavel Adamovich Ianushevsky, Petr Victorovich Korotkevich and Nikolai Ippolitovich Bratkovsky.

In all documents they are recorded as Byelorussians, in the album reports as Poles.

46. Case No. 39803. The accused: Valerian Valerianovich Khodosovsky.

According to the album report, he is a son of a "kulak", has been deprived of all property, is Pole. According to the documents and information in the case, he is a Byelorussian, a peasant of average means.

The indictment has been approved by Kiselev.

47. Case No. 37987. The accused: Vladimir Aleksandrovich Shaverduk.

On the indictment there is a decision by Kiselev: "To be sent to the Special Board as a rebel and a wrecker," and two days later the same Kiselev sanctioned the transfer of the case to the "group of three" of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).

48. Case No. 25776. The accused: Leon Nikolaevich Ostrovko, a Pole, illiterate.

On the indictment there are two decisions by Kiselev: On the front there is a letter "K" indicating the signature of Kiselev and that he approved the indictment on the strength of which the case must be considered according to the procedure of the order of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. The same day on the reverse side of the indictment there was inscribed a second decision by Kiselev: "Illiterate. To be interrogated by a prosecutor." In spite of this, in a few days Kiselev signs the album report on the strength of which Ostrovko was sentenced to VMN. While reviewing the case, Kiselev could not help noticing the personal documents of Ostrovko, from which it was seen that he was not a Pole but a Byelorussian.

49. Case No. 30501. The accused: 13 persons.

This case investigated by the Vitebsk City Division of the NKVD, was isolated from the general case in which 150 Poles were accused in various anti-Soviet activities.

The album report of the accused Elena Isaakovna Sheko was falsified. In the report it is stated that Sheiko, in accordance with the aim of the organi-

zation, was engaged in collecting spy information for the benefit of Poland and conducted processing and enlistment of diversionary rebel personnel. This does not appear in the data of the investigation. The nationality of Sheiko has been changed from Byelorussian to Polish.

The report on the defendant Frantz Iosifovich Kondrat has also been falsified. It is said there: "Enlisted the diversionary rebel personnel for the armed struggle against the Soviet government in the rear of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army." There is nothing like this in the records of the case.

This case inspires great doubts and is being verified by a special inquiry. The case was reviewed and the indictment was approved by Asst. Military Prosecutor Triaskin; the album reports were signed by Kiselev. All 13 persons were executed by shooting.

50. Case No. 11008. The accused: 38 persons (Poles).

Isolated from the same large case.

The album report on the accused Yushkevich is made up incorrectly. It is stated there that Yushkevich, in case of war between Poland and U.S.S.R., had as his task the destruction of the property of a kolkhoz by arson. This is not reflected in the testimony of the accused, and did not acknowledge his guilt in this respect.

To the album report on the accused Antos Feliksovich Anikhomovsky there has been added in writing that while working in 1937 in the U.S.S.R. he engaged in the collection of spy information. In regard to this question the defendant has not even been interrogated.

To the album report on the accused Mechislav Liudvigovich Ignatovich there has been added that during the war between Poland and the U.S.S.R. he had the task of putting out of commission the round-house of the Vitebsk railroad station, the water tower and other railroad installations. On this score the accused was not even questioned.

On all records of interrogation there are underlinings and the letter "K", made by the hand of Kiselev. He also approved the indictments and signed the album reports.

Of the above-mentioned 38 persons, 35 (including the enumerated accused) were sentenced to VMN. This case is also being verified.

51. Case No. 30699 of 40 persons (Poles).

This is obviously a fictitious case, because there were arrested not the same persons who underwent investigation.

Thus, Eva Iosifovna Linartovich was arrested illegally. The order for the arrest was issued for Eva Iosifovna Leortovich, a librarian of the Veterinary Institute. The order for the arrest was written out in her name also, but it was Linartovich who was arrested. To the case is attached the testimony of a certain Matskevich, in whose testimony is mentioned a Polish turncoat Eva Iosifovna Liubartovich, a member of the "POV". Still, in spite of this and the evident non-involvement of Linartovich in the matter,

she confessed during the interrogation that she was drawn into the "POV" by Matskevich. Sentenced to VMN.

In like manner was arrested Anel Valerianovna Plavinskaya. The order for the arrest, the sanction of the District Prosecutor and warrant for the arrest were written out for Stanislava Valerianovna Plavinskaya, born in 1909, while Anel Valerianovna Plavinskaya, born in 1894, was arrested. The names and the other year of birth have been clumsily changed in records. Anel Plavinskaya also confessed on full to the accusations presented, that she participated in the "POV". Sentenced to VMN.

Not less characteristic is the case of falsification of documents in the case of Frants Nikolaievich Bulavsky (the same case). The order was written out for the arrest of a certain Frants Nikolaievich Kulakovsky. However, after the Section Militia Inspector wrote a notation on the reverse side of the order that at the address indicated in the order there resided not Kulakovsky but Bulavsky, the name of Kulakovsky was crossed out and the name "Bulavsky" was written above it. On the strength of this counterfeit order, F. N. Bulavsky was arrested and on December 18, 1937, he testified that he was a member of the "POV", that he spread provocation rumors, etc. By whom Bulavsky and likewise Kulakovsky were enrolled is not seen from the case.

This case Kiselev also read. On each record of interrogation there is his notation—the letter "K". He also approved the indictment and signed the album report.

All 40 accused persons were sentenced to VMN. The criminal irresponsibility of Kiselev led to the fact that in all the above-mentioned cases (the majority of which was falsified)—all persons were sentenced to VMN.

Kiselev as a prosecutor did not conduct the proper struggle against those crying illegalities which were present during his whole work in the city of Minsk.

More than that. By his criminal irresponsibility Kiselev only helped the continuance of these illegalities for a long time.

According to the deposition of Katsev, Chief of the 2nd Section of the 3rd Division of the NKVD of the B.S.S.R., till June 1938 Kiselev practiced signing the album reports before he viewed the records of investigation. Later, with the arrival of Katsev in the 3rd Division, the latter refused to file the albums until the album reports were signed simultaneously with the approval of the indictments. Only after that did Kiselev change his style of work.

The majority of the album reports, both for the "Groups of Three" and for the consideration in accordance with Order No. 00485, were signed by Kiselev. As declared by Katsev during the review of the cases, Kiselev selected certain cases and wrote special instructions for them, but neither in the NKVD of the B.S.S.R., nor in the office of the Military Prosecutor, can these instructions be found, because they have been sent with the cases to various districts

and Kiselev did not retain copies. What number of cases was selected by Kiselev is absolutely impossible to establish, but according to the declaration of Katsev it is not more than 5-6% (his personal supposition). The same Katsev declared that he remembers no instance when Kiselev selected cases because of the non-correspondence of their material with the album reports or indictments.

Kiselev selected those cases, which, according to the expression of Katsev, "smelled too strongly of counterfeiting."

From June 1938 on, Kiselev attended meetings of the "Group of Three" only two or three times.

The hostile work of the former leadership of the NKVD of the B.S.S.R. was directed toward the extermination of the best personnel of workers, the membership of kolkhozes and the Soviet "intelligentsia" and toward the creation among the population of a hostile attitude, etc. In the process of investigation this leadership in many cases permitted definite tendencies for the employment of various illegal methods, which sometimes reached torture and even murder. In such surroundings, persons testified about their imaginary counter-revolutionary activities and implicated dozens and hundreds of other persons.

Thus, for example, it has been established that the former Chief of the 3rd Division—Gepstein—gave instructions to one group to secure by any means evidence of spying and diversionary activities. From 38 persons by various methods and means evidence was secured implicating 3,489 persons who in varying degree were found to be connected in spying and other counter-revolutionary activities with those who supplied the evidence.

Thus, one of the accused, Mikhail Isaakovich Aleksandrovich-Golomb, implicated by his testimony 121 persons, another accused, Semen Mikhailovich Iakubovich, implicated 104 persons, Pavel Gerasimovich Bobchenok, 107 persons, Ivan Stefanovich Volnets and Solomon Kivovich Baukh, 120 persons each, Sozont Ignatievich Iuzefovich, 183 persons, Boris Viacheslavovich Sporikhin, 241 persons, Foma Fomich Zhilinsky, 244 persons, and Bronislav Adamovich Tarashkevich, 249 persons.

It has been established that, due to the testimony of Zhilinsky alone, 105 persons were arrested, and on the testimony of Sporikhin, 74 persons. It is difficult to establish who issued sanctions for the arrests, because these persons were arrested in various cities of U.S.S.R. Information is also lacking regarding arrests of other people on the strength of testimony of the above-mentioned accused.

The former hostile leadership of the NKVD of the B.S.S.R. perpetrated actual club-law in regard to the Lettish nationals of the kolkhoz "Gaisma" in Bykhov district.

This kolkhoz was economically strong, had a quantity of cattle of various kinds, agricultural machinery, and very accurately carried out all its obli-

gations to the State. This kolkhoz embraced 37 households. From these 37 households 75 men were arrested. They were all accused and all confessed of spying for Latvia. These arrests were executed in two strokes, under the direct hostile instructions of the former People's Commissars for Internal Affairs of the B.S.S.R.—Berman and Nasedkin and also Gepstein.

As has been established by the present investigation, the majority of those arrested gave their testimony under physical pressure. As a result of this hostile activity, 46 persons in the first category were convicted; 16 persons were sentenced also to 10 years of ITL, 2 to 8 years, 1 to 5 years.

Aleksandr Karlovich Orshansky, arrested in this case, a member of the All-Union Central Committee (Bolsheviks), chairman of the village Soviet, was murdered in prison by Lonsky, the head of the cell who has been instructed to secure preliminary confessions by beatings.

Five persons were released from detention, and of three persons the whereabouts is unknown.

From the review of several cases for the above-mentioned persons it can be seen that a majority of them were allegedly exposed by the testimony of Lidum, an agent of Latvian intelligence, who also enrolled them. However, this testimony is not in the case record. In the personal dispositions of Lidum, the names of those persons do not appear at all.

Sanctions for the arrest of those accused persons were issued by Lifshita, Acting Prosecutor of the Mogilev Oblast, with regard to whom the pertinent material has been investigated.

The cases of 35 persons were surveyed by Kiselev, who also approved indictments and signed album reports.

The Special Commission of the NKVD of the B.S.S.R. has established by the current investigation that this case is fictitious and has been created by the former hostile leadership.

Likewise under instructions of Gepstein, there were carried out wholesale operations for the elimination of Assyrians. Altogether 32 persons were arrested. Released from detention 23, died in prison 5, and with regard to 4 persons the cases have gone to the Special Board.

At the same time, this hostile leadership carefully protected from arrest many real enemies and the worst enemies of the people. The fundamental drive of this former leadership, as can be seen from many facts possessed by the NKVD of the B.S.S.R., was directed towards the extermination of the best Soviet personnel. And in this respect Kiselev rendered no small service to this hostile leadership.

During the investigation the Commission has not established a single document from which could be seen that during 1937-1938 Kiselev reacted to all those infamies which were present and which he, as a prosecutor, could not help noticing.

CONCLUSIONS

1. By verified data, former Acting Prosecutor Kiselev is characterized as a person who had a criminally irresponsible attitude to the important work entrusted to him.

2. Having this attitude, Kiselev, in carrying out his work, rubber-stamped sanctions, cases, indictments and album reports. This led to his skipping a great number of cases, and people involved in these cases were sentenced to VMN and other kinds of punishment.

3. By his criminal irresponsibility, Kiselev helped the former hostile leadership of the NKVD of the B.S.S.R. (Berman, Nasedkin, Stoyanovsky, Gepstein and others) to put into practice their counter-revolutionary work directed at extermination of the best Soviet personnel.

Chairman of the Commission:

Asst. Military Prosecutor of LVO
Military Jurist, 1st Class—KOLOKOLOV

Members of the Commission:

Asst. Prosecutor of the B.S.S.R.—
DMITRAKOV
Chief of the 1st Special Division
of the NKVD of the B.S.S.R., Sr.
Lieut. of State Security Police—
GORBACHEVSKY

Comrade Gertsovsky,
Captain of State Security,
Chief, Special Section 1 of the
NKVD of U.S.S.R.,
Moscow.

Enclosed herewith is a declaration by citizen A. S. Rzhesskaya with respect to the arrest of her husband, who had been sentenced to VMN by the Special Group of Three of the NKVD of the Byelorussian S.S.R. in 1937. In February 1940, the case of Stanislaw Rzhessky was reviewed by the District NKVD of the Minsk district and his relatives were rehabilitated.

Citizen Rzhesskaya indicates in her declaration that the Prosecutor of the city Borisov informed her that her husband had been acquitted and the slanderers convicted, but her husband has not returned to date.

I am asking you for instructions as to how to reply to her on the substance of her inquiry. We do not believe that it would be expedient to answer according to Directive No. 0515, paragraph 6, of the NKVD of the U.S.S.R., in as much as it would entail unnecessary correspondence.

For our part, we would propose to inform her that her husband died in camp in 1940.

If you do not object to such a reply, we ask that you attest to it when returning the declaration, and at the same time inform the Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. of this with a view to giving a single answer to the declarer if she should apply to the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. with respect to this matter. After receiving your assent, we will likewise inform the Prosecutor of the Republic of the reply given her.

At the same time, kindly indicate the course of action to be taken in the future when such complaints are received.

Chief, Special Section 1 of the
NKVD of the Byelorussian S.S.R.,
Lieutenant of State Security (Shepelev)

Chief, Section 3,
Lieutenant of State Security (Perepechko)

March 29, 1941,
Minsk.

TELEGRAM

September 23, 1929
Moscow

To OGPU (NKVD)
Minsk

Make ready 5000 prisoners: 100 Russians, 1500 Poles and the rest Byelorussians.

OGPU (NKVD)
Moscow.

NOTE:

The history of the above telegram is as follows:

The management of the concentration camp on the Solovetskye Islands—USLON, has several organized enterprises, which are administered on a "commercial pattern," exploiting the slave-work of those imprisoned on the islands.

Because of cheap production, orders from the Soviet Government often confronted USLON with an impossibility of completing them, because of shortage of "work hands".

To avoid stoppages in completing Moscow orders, USLON had its permanent representative Comrade Greysner at Moscow OGPU (NKVD), who presented to OGPU all needs of USLON.

It's interesting that Moscow OGPU, which sent the telegram to OGPU in Minsk for arrest of 5000 citizens of the Soviet Byelorussia, delivered the copy and the receipt for telegram expenses to Comrade Greysheer. The latter enclosed the receipt in his report to USLON.

The bookkeeper of USLON on the Solovetskye Islands was an imprisoned Ukrainian engineer, Kekalo, who made a copy of the telegram.

At present Engineer Kekalo is in New York. Before the Russo-German war, he was transported to central Russia because of his unfitness for work and thus got a chance to be free.